On to the Romans. This book, which was partly triggered by Montesquieu visiting Italy on the same journey, is way more fun, and not just because of the Fritz notes. In both cases, though, it's worth constantly keeping in mind Montesquieu is writing from the pov of a conservative French aristocrat, who despite all the compliments paid to Louis XIV regrets Louis' declawing of the French nobility to no end. (Louis revoking the Edict of Nantes and persecuting Protestants, otoh, is A plus.) All the observations on Roman decadence thus also have the subtext of criticism of current day France without getting censored for it. (Which, btw, isn't that different from Roman historians putting their present day criticism into the mouth of "barbarian" leaders and/or waxing on on how much better the ancestors did it.) Thus, Rome was doing well when the wise Patrician Senate was in charge, creating the Tribunes was already a step in the wrong direction, and naturally once the Empire came to be and the Senate devolved into a rubber stamp for imperial decisions, while the Emperors were except for five of them no good luxury loving parasites, everything went down the toilet.

Something else striking the modern reader is that Montesquieu except for one remark that comes very late into Roman history (we're talking 4th century AD already), and one earlier remark where he sighs Hannibal should have had a Homer to write him, not a Livy, he's not source critical. The introduction is defensive about this and says of course he didn't doubt his Roman historians were telling the truth, he was an ancient writers loving 18th century guy! To which I say, well, so was Voltaire, and his preface to his Charles XII. history is satiric fun about why he doesn't buy what a lot of ancient historians serve up due to the obvious contradictions, and thus he feels at liberty to go for the most likely (in his opinion) explanation there as in more modern histories. Meanwhile, the preface insists Fritz must have known Montesquieu is the much, much deeper writer than Voltaire and wonders why he made Montesquieu an honorable member of the Berlin Academy but didn't invite him, because surely Montesquieu wouldn't have disappointed him the way a certain shallow other French writer did!

Back to "Greatness and Fall of Rome". It is a very stylish, often witty and always opinionated book, so it's easy to see why Fritz both loved it and mentally argued with it now and then. The reason why we have his underlinings and scribbled marginalia published when we don't with other books from his libraries is this: when Napoleon came to visit Sanssouci after having defeated Prussia, he swiped it as a personal souvenir. I don't blame him. I mean, I do blame Napoleon for other things, but not this. Totally would have done the same thing, though possibly I'd have gone for a Voltaire work instead in the hope of finding more shippy hilarity, but I can see why fanboy Bonaparte was more into Fritz' thoughts on Montesquieu's thoughts about the Romans. Anyway, that's why this copy ended up in a French national library instead of a German one and got published.

When did Fritz write his comments? It's still a guessing game. As the German translator says, some sound as if written by Crown Prince Fritz in Rheinsberg, others more like King Fritz. We do know he's read the first edition since he quotes from it in one of his few letters to Émilie, no less. (This was a problem for the French and German editor alike, because there are some passages in the first eidtion which Montesquieu cut in later editions, but they eventually decided to go with the edition that Fritz had.)

Montesquieu starts with the foundation of Rome and ends with the fall of Constantinople to the Turks, though obviously picking and choosing different eras for emphasis. Fritz is mostly interested in the late Republic and the Empire, but does comment occasionally before that. The German edition reproduces his underlinings and his marginalia (he didn't always write a comment when underlining). The mere underlinings can be very telling about Fritz, like this one:

"And since (the up and coming Roman Republic about to conquer Italy) could not imagine existing without ruling, neither fear nor hope could force it to conclude a peace treaty it hadn't dictated."

Or, when Montesquieu writes: "It usually isn't the real loss suffered in a battle (i.e. the one of several thousands of men) who come to cause the state harm, but the assumed loss, and the discouragement which take what strength fate has left from it."

Fritz underlines this and comments: "Very true and very well reasoned! The frightened imagination of the soldiers is a spectre winning more battles than the material strength and superiority of the enemy."

Or, Montesquieu about Hannibal "Conquests are easy to make, since one can use all one's force for them. But they are difficult to hold since one can defend them with only a part of one's force."

Fritz writes: "A proof for this is Louis XIV who conquered the Netherlands quickly and then was forced to withdraw from its towns just as quickly as he'd won them."

(Or, one might say, Fritz in Bohemia in Silesia 2.)

When Montesquieu when talking about the Romans and their system of client kings gives a flashback about Macedonian history pre Romans and inevitably mentions Philip and Alexander, we get these two gems:

Montesquieu: "Their (Macedonian) monarchy wasn't among those developing along predictable lines. Always learning from dangers and events and embroiled in all the arguments between the Greeks, they had to win the most important cities for themselves, to dazzle and blind the people and to separate or unite them by interests. While doing all of this, they were always forced to put their own lives on the line for their cause."

Fritz: These Macedon kings were what a King of Prussia and a King of Sardinia are today.

(Me: You really wanted that Sardinia guy as an ally , then?)

Montesquieu when talking about Antiochos makes a comparison to his national hero Louis XIV and says about Louis, alluding to Louis refusing the "get rid of your grandson on the Spanish throne" condition by the allies when the War of Spanish Succesion turned against him:

I know nothing more noble than the decision of a monarch who has ruled into our time to rather let himself be buried under the wreckage of his throne than to accept conditions which a King cannot listen to. He had too proud a soul to sink any further than the blows of destiny had put him, and he knew that courage can strengthen a crown anew, but never craven humility.

To this, a Fritz who sounds as if he's definitely King Fritz and familiar with several peace treaties with MT, not just one, comments:

This is very well thought of a great King who can face many of his enemies at the same time. But a prince whose military strength and power is lesser has to accomodate his era and circumstances somewhat more.

Now, Montesquieu's basic theory is that the laws by which the Roman Republic had governed itself were no longer workable once Rome had expanded so much that it had become an Empire, and this its own greatness carried the seed of its downfall, making the civil war and then the monarchy inevitable. (This is why Montesquieu still has fans today, since it's a modern pov that doesn't blame/credit just one or two individuals for this development.) Which doesn't mean he does not have opinions on individual Romans and their conduct, and here, Fritz entertainingly disagrees with him.

Montesquieu, on Caesar's famous clemency towards his defeated enemies: Caesar forgave each and everyone. (After the civil war.) But it seems to me that moderation shown after one has taken everything by force doesn't deserve any plaudits.

Fritz: This is an exaggarated critique! Sulla, the barbarian Sulla, didn't show as much moderation as Caesar; a low soul which could have avenged itself would still have done it. But Caesar only forgave. It's always beautiful to forgive, even if one doesn't have to fear anything anymore.

Montesquieu: Caesar, who had always been an enemy of the Senate, couldn't disguise the contempt he felt for this body which had become a mockery of itself since losing power. This is why even his clemency was an insult. One saw he didn't forgive, but that he simply declined to punish.

Fritz: This thought is exaggarated! If one measured all actions of all people by this strict standard, there wouildn't be a heroic deed left. He who proves too much proves nothing!

Fritz also takes the occasional swipe at the current daycompetition people.

Montesquieu: Besides, often great men are forged in civil wars, because in the confusion those who have talent rise to the top, each according to their abilities, while at other times one is put at a place which one is completely wrong for.

Fritz (underlining this and adding): Don Carlos would not have won any fame in the Civil Wars! How few people of rank would have had success back then. The incapable often luck out by blind fortune helping their cause.

Then there are Cicero and Cato. Montesquieu's comparison between the two was one which impressed and irritated Fritz and which he brought up in a letter to Émilie. cahn, to understand the point, it's worth recalling that while both Cato and Cicero had sided with the Senate & Pompey against Caesar in the Civil War, Cato ended up coommitting suicide rather than being pardoned by Caesar, while Cicero did accept clemency, outlived Caesar and then, as the last remaining representative of the old school Senate, made the mistake of thinking that by backing Octavian against Antony, he could get rid of Antony and restore the Republic to its old self, completely underestimating young Octavian (as so many did).

Montesquieu (underlinings by Fritz): I believe hat if Cato had preserved himself for the Republic, he would have been able to give all ensuing events another twist. Cicero who had admirable qualities in a supporting part, was utterly incapable of playing the lead. He had a beautiful mind, but often a somewhat ordinary soul. With Cicero, virtue was often a side thought, while with Cato, fame was secondary. Cicero always saw himself first, Cato forgot himself always. One wanted to save the Republic for its own sake, the other in order to boast of it.

Fritz: If a citizen contributes something good to public welfare: if he does it only for the pleasure of doing good, he's all the more admirable, but if he does it for the sake of fame, the principle isn't as nice, but surely the effect is the same!

Montesquieu uses Cato's suicide to ruminate on how different the Roman attitude towards suicide was than the current day one is (where suicide is treated as a crime and suicidees aren't allowed to be buried with law abiding folk). Fritz has STRONG OPINIONS in his marginalia, of which there are three on one page.

On suicide in general: This is a means which should be used only with great caution, for the obvious reason that you can only do it once.

Montesquieu: Finally it is a great convenience for heroes to be able to end the part they're playing on the world's stage immediately when they want to.

Fritz (underlining the above): Any action which happens with the consent of the people concerned is a legal. If I decide to take my life, I give my consent. So this is not a violent action breaking the law but a voluntary act which thus becomes legal.

Montesquieu: It is a certain that people are less free, less courageous and less ready to commit great deeds than they were in an era where due to the power one had over oneself one could always escape any other power.

Fritz (underlining this): Religion wherever it was spread has weakened the courage of nations. A man who fears killing himself has to fear death. And fearing death means being not courageous. Besides, the fear of the judgments by the canonized Proserpina makes many a man tremble who without this article of faith would have risen above such fear.