Oohh, this is very neat! It's not the least bit surprising of Eichel, but it is new information.
Here are the two Heinrich passages for you:
Previously Mitchell had been wary of Henry because of his pro-French sympathies but during the months when he accompanied him on campaign he came to see a different side to the King's brother. In Henry Mitchell found the ideal military commander, one who struck a proper balance between valour and humanitas. He praised the 'goodness' with which the prince treated prisoners, his care for the common soldier and his consideration for his officers, and he admired his 'coolness and presence of mind under fire'. Henry, in fact, had all of Frederick's qualities as a commander except his daring, and conspiciously lacked his impatience, his urge to settle everything in one great battle and his unconcern for his men. during this campaign Mitchell alid the basis of that friendship with Henry which lasted for the rest of his life.
Suspicious Eichel, a year later, when Mitchell instead of staying at headquarters with Fritz goes with Heinrich to Glogau in November 1760:
As worrying as Mitchell's absence from headquarters was his growing intimacy with Henry. Eichel, for one, was particularly unhappy about this. Since the end of August, when Frederick had amalgamated Henry's army with his own force, the prince had been sulking. Returning to Breslau, 'se sentant incommodi d'un accès de fievre', as Eichel wrote carefully to Finckenstein, he brooded over the loss of his command. The subsequent estrangement between the two brothers was a further source of that discontent and flagging morale which both Eichel and Mitchell noted among the army command. Many of the general officers shared Henry's view that the concentration of all the troops into one army seriously reduced the capability of the state to defend itself, whereas Frederick was prepared to accept this risk for the possibility of inflicting a massive defeat on one of his enemies should such an opportunity arise. First at Breslau, then ata Glogau, Mitchell was very much thrown into the company of Henry and in the eyes of Eichel, and perhaps Frederick himself, risked being contaminated by the dissatisfaction with the handling of the war which Henry's circle professed. AS so much depended on Britain retaining belief in Frederick's ability to survive, Eichel's concern was understandable. Mitchell was, in fact, trying to persuade Henry to return to headquarters and heal the breach with the King. But he failed in this attempt 'to heal, to soften and to apologize for the King of Prussia's conduct towards him'.
(This would be when Mitchell wrote he was trying to persuade Prussian ministers to help him reconciling the brothers, but that they chickened out. Maybe he meant Eichel?)
Re: Andrew Mitchell: The Return - Emotionally Compromised
Here are the two Heinrich passages for you:
Previously Mitchell had been wary of Henry because of his pro-French sympathies but during the months when he accompanied him on campaign he came to see a different side to the King's brother. In Henry Mitchell found the ideal military commander, one who struck a proper balance between valour and humanitas. He praised the 'goodness' with which the prince treated prisoners, his care for the common soldier and his consideration for his officers, and he admired his 'coolness and presence of mind under fire'. Henry, in fact, had all of Frederick's qualities as a commander except his daring, and conspiciously lacked his impatience, his urge to settle everything in one great battle and his unconcern for his men. during this campaign Mitchell alid the basis of that friendship with Henry which lasted for the rest of his life.
Suspicious Eichel, a year later, when Mitchell instead of staying at headquarters with Fritz goes with Heinrich to Glogau in November 1760:
As worrying as Mitchell's absence from headquarters was his growing intimacy with Henry. Eichel, for one, was particularly unhappy about this. Since the end of August, when Frederick had amalgamated Henry's army with his own force, the prince had been sulking. Returning to Breslau, 'se sentant incommodi d'un accès de fievre', as Eichel wrote carefully to Finckenstein, he brooded over the loss of his command. The subsequent estrangement between the two brothers was a further source of that discontent and flagging morale which both Eichel and Mitchell noted among the army command. Many of the general officers shared Henry's view that the concentration of all the troops into one army seriously reduced the capability of the state to defend itself, whereas Frederick was prepared to accept this risk for the possibility of inflicting a massive defeat on one of his enemies should such an opportunity arise. First at Breslau, then ata Glogau, Mitchell was very much thrown into the company of Henry and in the eyes of Eichel, and perhaps Frederick himself, risked being contaminated by the dissatisfaction with the handling of the war which Henry's circle professed. AS so much depended on Britain retaining belief in Frederick's ability to survive, Eichel's concern was understandable. Mitchell was, in fact, trying to persuade Henry to return to headquarters and heal the breach with the King. But he failed in this attempt 'to heal, to soften and to apologize for the King of Prussia's conduct towards him'.
(This would be when Mitchell wrote he was trying to persuade Prussian ministers to help him reconciling the brothers, but that they chickened out. Maybe he meant Eichel?)