RE: memoirs, are you sure we're the right Kalkreuth and the right Henckel von Donnersmarck? because there are numerous historical figures (and one living movie director, of course) with these names in the Stabi. I did get my hands on (the right) Kalckreuth's memoirs in an online version, but via the Staatsbibliothek Berlin, not München.
(Published Henckel von Donnersmarcks with Heinrich connections: Victor Leo Amadeus - the one serving with him in the Seventh Years War. Got a mention on the obelisk. His son: the one Heinrich took care of after his father's death, along with the widow. Is responsible for some of the excentric old age Heinrich anecdotes. Grandson: editor of Grandpa's letters and papers.)
(The library in Munich has the selection of letters from the Divine Trio to Henckel v. Donnersmarck, edited by his grandson, which the Allgemeine Deutsche Biographie entry is fuming about because so unfair to The Great.)
Anyway, if you could find the correct Henckel v. Donnersmarck & Kalckreuth, and in German, not French, then by all means, put it in the library. I've been reading the Kalckreuth online, more below, but a pdf is handier.
"Sire hat mächtig gespachtelt"? I'm guessing something like "really tucked in/ate his fill"?
That is correct. And yes, lol at the military terminology which no, isn't usual for meals.
The ten days visit of the brothers in Berlin in January 1747: alas for Peter. Though in general, make sure you check the second Lehndorff volume which has more on this visit compared to the first one.
Now, I've got some quotes for you: Online, completely is an essay by Jürgen Luh (the deconstructing Fritz biographer) about AW in 1757, as well as the changing takes on the subject in historiography, here. Here's Luh having a go at various Fritz-was-right historians, in this case, Gustav Volz.
Luh quotiong Volz, Volz is speaking: "The Prince claims that he needed to wait for the orders of the King whom he's asked for - but didn't the war situation demand instant action? Winterfeldt hit the crucial point when reporting (to Fritz) on July 26th: "Nothing can result from all these war counselling, it needs someone to command with resolution."" Here Volz conveniently neglects to mention that the "war counselling" generals (advising AW) included the later celebrated by every historian generals Seydlitz and Zieten, as well as Normann, a protegé of Winterfeldts, and Lestwitz. To accuse them of incompetence would have been rather difficult."
Quite. Luh in general points out that contemporary writers like Henckel von Donnersmarck defending AW were later dismissed by historians due to their connection to Heinrich, and Heinrich himself as blinded by his love for AW and hate for Fritz, while the fact that later Prussian folk heroes like Seydlitz and Zieten had agreed with AW as well could be left out because neither had left memoirs. As for the critical matter itself, here's Luh's conclusion:
To retain Jungbunzlau, as Friedrich's orders for August Wilhelm had commanded, was impossible, as the Austrians could have circumvented the place either through the way from Nimburg to Backofen, or through the way from Nimburg via Eisenbrod to Turnau, and thus could have cut off the Prussians's way of' retreat into the Lausitz. August Wilhelm's decision to retreat was therefore correct. What he can be accused of at most, with hindsight, that is, is that he didn't march more quickly with his troops, that he took a sideway for the retreat and not the better main road via Münchengrätz, Gabel and Zittau. That he didn't do this was due to Friedrich's command to keep up the connection to Silesia - which, as we've seen, was impossible - and at the same time to keep up the connection to the King's army. In the end, what one can hold against August Wilhelm is only that he didn't go against his Friedrich's orders. Even this with a caveat, though the accusation has been made throughout historiography. For if the Prince of Prussia had ignored the King's orders and had - in his correct estimation of the situation - retreated as quickly as possible to Zittau and from there into the Lausitz, the King's army would have been completely surrounded by the Austrians, since the King wanted to remain in Bohemia. Heinrich and the Generals had recognized this danger early on and had therefore worked out a plan of retreat for the army after the defeat at Kolin. They wanted the troops to march to Saxony and into the Lausitz. This anticipated which - after some human and material losses - became reality at the end of July and in early August 1757. That the King took his brother's honour and army is probably mainly due to his anger at himself. This public slap in the face would not have been necessary, for except for a part of the baggage train, some canons and the magazine in Zittau, August Wilhelm had not lost more than the usual deserters, not the entire army as the King himself had done in 1744.
Now, re: the Kalckreuth memoirs from the Berlin Stabi, I've been reading bits and pieces, since a lot are battle descriptions. But there's one fascinating bit about Glasow I have to share. (Cahn, Glasow: the other handsome husar, Fredersdorf's successor as Fritz' valet. Went with Fritz on the trip to the Netherlands. Around the Easter holidays of 1757, Lehndorff notes in his diary the sensational gossip that Glasow has been arrested for attempting to poison the King in the Countess Brühl's employ (she's the wife of the Saxon PM). Glasow dies while under arrest in Spandau. Now, Kalckreuth isn't the most reliable himself (he's vain and of the "all Heinrich's great deeds? that was really me!" persuasion, plus after being dumped for Kaphengst, he has a beef there), and there's the skeevy part he played in Mina's fate to consider. But as to whether or not Glasow is guilty is irrelevant to Kalckreuth's own reputation, and therefore, he might be telling the truth when he writes thusly:
In Dresden, the unfortuante event with Glasow happened, which the public has distorted so much. This is the truth: This Glasow had been the King's husar of the chamber, i.e. a valet dressed up as a hussar, and very much in favour. Antinous could not have been more beautiful. He had started out as a tambour in the Regiment Schwerin. During the earlier winter quarter, the Countess Brühl had asked him twice to take a cup of chocolate with her, in order to sound him out whether there wasn't a means to soothe the King's anger against Saxony, and he'd accepted the invitation. It was quite ridiculous that the Countess Brühl, a universally respected lady, wanted to discuss such matters with a fop. Glasow had been wrong to keep this tete-a-tete from the King, admittedly. Later, in the spring, the Countess got exiled to Warsaw. Back then, Glasow had a servant, a disgusting creature, and at the same time the King had a page named Wulnitz, who wasn't able to love Glasow. The page became an officer in the regiment Garde du Corps - footnote: this was Kalckreuth's own original regiment before becoming Heinrich's AD - and took into his service the same villain whom Glasow had employed as a servant the previous winter. This same miserable creature was sent into town and encountered Glasow, who probably was harsh to him due to his bad conduct earlier. At once, he complained to his new master and added that he could ruin Glasow if he were to denounce Glasow's rendezvous to the King. It is said his new master encouraged him to do so. At once, Glasow was arrested and sent to Spandau, where he was locked up with the common criminals. With his weakened body, he soon died. My worthy commander - i.e. Heinrich - and myself were indignant, because Glasow had been a good egg, and hadn't harmed anyone. The public, which is prone to only believe the most stupid versions, deduced from this that the Countess Brühl had invited Glasow to seduce him into poisoning the chocolate he was serving to the King every morning.
Memoirs, Defenses and Glasow, Oh My!
(Published Henckel von Donnersmarcks with Heinrich connections: Victor Leo Amadeus - the one serving with him in the Seventh Years War. Got a mention on the obelisk. His son: the one Heinrich took care of after his father's death, along with the widow. Is responsible for some of the excentric old age Heinrich anecdotes. Grandson: editor of Grandpa's letters and papers.)
(The library in Munich has the selection of letters from the Divine Trio to Henckel v. Donnersmarck, edited by his grandson, which the Allgemeine Deutsche Biographie entry is fuming about because so unfair to The Great.)
Anyway, if you could find the correct Henckel v. Donnersmarck & Kalckreuth, and in German, not French, then by all means, put it in the library. I've been reading the Kalckreuth online, more below, but a pdf is handier.
"Sire hat mächtig gespachtelt"? I'm guessing something like "really tucked in/ate his fill"?
That is correct. And yes, lol at the military terminology which no, isn't usual for meals.
The ten days visit of the brothers in Berlin in January 1747: alas for Peter. Though in general, make sure you check the second Lehndorff volume which has more on this visit compared to the first one.
Now, I've got some quotes for you: Online, completely is an essay by Jürgen Luh (the deconstructing Fritz biographer) about AW in 1757, as well as the changing takes on the subject in historiography, here. Here's Luh having a go at various Fritz-was-right historians, in this case, Gustav Volz.
Luh quotiong Volz, Volz is speaking: "The Prince claims that he needed to wait for the orders of the King whom he's asked for - but didn't the war situation demand instant action? Winterfeldt hit the crucial point when reporting (to Fritz) on July 26th: "Nothing can result from all these war counselling, it needs someone to command with resolution.""
Here Volz conveniently neglects to mention that the "war counselling" generals (advising AW) included the later celebrated by every historian generals Seydlitz and Zieten, as well as Normann, a protegé of Winterfeldts, and Lestwitz. To accuse them of incompetence would have been rather difficult."
Quite. Luh in general points out that contemporary writers like Henckel von Donnersmarck defending AW were later dismissed by historians due to their connection to Heinrich, and Heinrich himself as blinded by his love for AW and hate for Fritz, while the fact that later Prussian folk heroes like Seydlitz and Zieten had agreed with AW as well could be left out because neither had left memoirs. As for the critical matter itself, here's Luh's conclusion:
To retain Jungbunzlau, as Friedrich's orders for August Wilhelm had commanded, was impossible, as the Austrians could have circumvented the place either through the way from Nimburg to Backofen, or through the way from Nimburg via Eisenbrod to Turnau, and thus could have cut off the Prussians's way of' retreat into the Lausitz. August Wilhelm's decision to retreat was therefore correct. What he can be accused of at most, with hindsight, that is, is that he didn't march more quickly with his troops, that he took a sideway for the retreat and not the better main road via Münchengrätz, Gabel and Zittau. That he didn't do this was due to Friedrich's command to keep up the connection to Silesia - which, as we've seen, was impossible - and at the same time to keep up the connection to the King's army.
In the end, what one can hold against August Wilhelm is only that he didn't go against his Friedrich's orders. Even this with a caveat, though the accusation has been made throughout historiography. For if the Prince of Prussia had ignored the King's orders and had - in his correct estimation of the situation - retreated as quickly as possible to Zittau and from there into the Lausitz, the King's army would have been completely surrounded by the Austrians, since the King wanted to remain in Bohemia. Heinrich and the Generals had recognized this danger early on and had therefore worked out a plan of retreat for the army after the defeat at Kolin. They wanted the troops to march to Saxony and into the Lausitz. This anticipated which - after some human and material losses - became reality at the end of July and in early August 1757. That the King took his brother's honour and army is probably mainly due to his anger at himself. This public slap in the face would not have been necessary, for except for a part of the baggage train, some canons and the magazine in Zittau, August Wilhelm had not lost more than the usual deserters, not the entire army as the King himself had done in 1744.
Now, re: the Kalckreuth memoirs from the Berlin Stabi, I've been reading bits and pieces, since a lot are battle descriptions. But there's one fascinating bit about Glasow I have to share. (Cahn, Glasow: the other handsome husar, Fredersdorf's successor as Fritz' valet. Went with Fritz on the trip to the Netherlands. Around the Easter holidays of 1757, Lehndorff notes in his diary the sensational gossip that Glasow has been arrested for attempting to poison the King in the Countess Brühl's employ (she's the wife of the Saxon PM). Glasow dies while under arrest in Spandau. Now, Kalckreuth isn't the most reliable himself (he's vain and of the "all Heinrich's great deeds? that was really me!" persuasion, plus after being dumped for Kaphengst, he has a beef there), and there's the skeevy part he played in Mina's fate to consider. But as to whether or not Glasow is guilty is irrelevant to Kalckreuth's own reputation, and therefore, he might be telling the truth when he writes thusly:
In Dresden, the unfortuante event with Glasow happened, which the public has distorted so much. This is the truth: This Glasow had been the King's husar of the chamber, i.e. a valet dressed up as a hussar, and very much in favour. Antinous could not have been more beautiful. He had started out as a tambour in the Regiment Schwerin. During the earlier winter quarter, the Countess Brühl had asked him twice to take a cup of chocolate with her, in order to sound him out whether there wasn't a means to soothe the King's anger against Saxony, and he'd accepted the invitation. It was quite ridiculous that the Countess Brühl, a universally respected lady, wanted to discuss such matters with a fop. Glasow had been wrong to keep this tete-a-tete from the King, admittedly.
Later, in the spring, the Countess got exiled to Warsaw. Back then, Glasow had a servant, a disgusting creature, and at the same time the King had a page named Wulnitz, who wasn't able to love Glasow. The page became an officer in the regiment Garde du Corps - footnote: this was Kalckreuth's own original regiment before becoming Heinrich's AD - and took into his service the same villain whom Glasow had employed as a servant the previous winter. This same miserable creature was sent into town and encountered Glasow, who probably was harsh to him due to his bad conduct earlier. At once, he complained to his new master and added that he could ruin Glasow if he were to denounce Glasow's rendezvous to the King. It is said his new master encouraged him to do so. At once, Glasow was arrested and sent to Spandau, where he was locked up with the common criminals. With his weakened body, he soon died. My worthy commander - i.e. Heinrich - and myself were indignant, because Glasow had been a good egg, and hadn't harmed anyone. The public, which is prone to only believe the most stupid versions, deduced from this that the Countess Brühl had invited Glasow to seduce him into poisoning the chocolate he was serving to the King every morning.