Okay, now the big one. Just to put things in to perspective: as of early 1756, if you had asked which brother gets along best with Fritz, who of the three younger ones is his favourite, the universal answer by everyone would have been AW. Not just because AW seems to have gotten along with most people, but because, the 1749 Heinrich argument excepted, Fritz didn‘t quarrel with him. The letters are sometimes teasing but without bite and friendly, it at times a bit condescending. When AW on the occasion of the treaty with England seems to have wondered how the rest of Europe will react, Fritz, in full hubris mode, replies:
This year which I expect to have won is worth as much as five of the preceding ones, and, if in the future I can serve as mediator for the belligerent powers, I will have created for Prussia the greatest role that it can play in peacetime; and do you count for nothing the pleasure of stopping the Queen of Hungary, of humiliating, or to put it better, of destroying Saxony, of making Bestushew despair? These are the consequences that a little stroke of the pen will have.
Yes, well. The Diplomatic Revolution happens, also by a little stroke of the pen, France is now Austria‘s ally, and AW dares to wonder whether maybe, just maybe, having so many nations to fight against is a bit dangerous? My dear brother. If our enemies force us to wage war, we must ask…: where are they? but not…: how many are there? We have nothing to fear, our enemies have more reason to run than us, and, according to the rule of probabilities, we will get out of this trap with all possible honor. Let the women in Berlin talk about sharing treaties ... but, for Prussian officers who fought our wars, they must have seen that neither the number nor the difficulties could have robbed us of the victory; they must think that these are the same troops now as in the last war, that the whole army is more trained in the maneuvers of battles, and that, if we do not fall into very rough blunders, it is morally impossible that we miss our shot. This is a comforting thought, my dear brother, which, I hope, will dissipate the fogs that politicians and political ladies have spread over the city. I embrace you, assuring you of the tenderness with which I am, my dear brother, your faithful brother and servant Federic.
Naturally, when things start to go wrong, there is one person whose fault it can't possibly be. How much or little AW was at fault for the military disaster to come has been debated ever since it happened. He's written a defense before he died, but had been dissuaded from publishing it mid war. In the end, it wasn't published until the late 19th century, and then it was condemned by patriotic Prussian historians as "one sided" (you think?) and damaging to the memory of the Great King. Among the points of contention: did Fritz give AW clear or conflicting orders - on top of everything else going wrong, several of their letters crossed or were delivered too late - , could AW, given the information he had, have acted differently, did he just let things happen without trying to prevent disaster? Ziebura argued:
The relative immovability of his army wasn't Wilhelm's fault. The King had dumped everything on him which he himself hadn't wanted to be burdened with - canons, pontons and the heavy baggage. Hence, the Prince needed urgently a positive order from Friedrich - what exactly did his supreme commander want him to do? Cover Silesia or remain in Bohemia and protect Zittau, for as things stood, the former and the later were mutually exclusive. (...) If Friedrich and with him later historians blame the Prince of Prussia for his hesitation, his "too long war councils", his indicisiveness, even his phlegma, they should have asked for the reason for his remaining in Leipa. That reason was his incapability to act against the King's explicit wishes and to rely solely on his own judgment. He wasn't the only one finding himself in this position. The Prince of Bevern in Breslau, Schmettau in Dresden and Finck at Maxen had all, by following the King's orders against their better knowledge, experienced a fiacso. They were all punished with disgrace, with a casheering.
The public condemnation of AW and all top officers - except for Winterfeldt, who had been one of the generals with AW on this campaign but was also one of Fritz' most trusted generals and had to read out the points of accusation against the others - as decribed by Fontane you already have read. Remember, Fritz refused to speak to AW on that occason, though according to AW's later defense essay: Shortly after he called General Goltz and told him: "He may tell my brother and all his Generals that if I had done justice, I'd have had beheaded the lot of them."
A stunned AW returns to Bautzen, writing a letter to Fritz not in the Trier file, asking for a commission to be formed to investigate his behavior; he is sure that they will clear his name. What Fritz writes back is this: You have put my affairs in a desperate situation by your bad behavior; it is not my enemies who will make me lose, but the wrong actions you have taken. My generals are inexcusable, either for having advised you badly, or for having allowed you to make such bad decisions. Your ears are only accustomed to the language of flatterers; Daun didn't flatter you, and you see the aftermath. IN this sad situation it only remains for me to take the most desperate actions. I will fight, and we will all be massacred, if we cannot succeed. I am not accusing your heart, but your inability and your lack of judgment to take the best advantage. I‘m telling you the truth. Who has only one moment to live, has nothing to hide. I wish you more happiness than I had.
Fritz had forbidden contact between AW and Heinrich (or anyone else) at this point. Heinrich ignored this and went to Bautzen along with his AD Henckel through whose war diary we know about this. On this occason, AW showed him all the letters Fritz had written him before and after and gave him a thorough description of the campaign. Heinrich agreed with AW that the King blaming Wilhelm exlusively for the botched withdrawal was not justified. He also supported AW's decision to go to Dresden when he saw how much weight his brother had lost and how miserable he looked.
In Dresden, things didn't get better. Fever, insomnia, throwing up, and increasing desperation. Renewed petitions to justify in front Fritz didn't work.
I do not reply to your letter, my dear Brother, because your head is spinning, and I believe that you wrote it in a delirium of hot fever. I am your faithful brother and servant Federic
At which point AW asked for permission to return to Berlin. This was about the worst thing he could have done. Writes Fritz:
What, you want to flee, while we fight to keep the state for you and your family? You want to set an example to cowards of the army, who may say: We are only asking for what the Prince of Prussia has obtained? Blush to the bottom of your soul the proposals you make to me; you speak of your honor: it lay in leading the army well and not to lose four battaillons, your magazine and your baggage in one stroke. I willl not entrust you another commando again for as long as I live. (...) But you may remain with the army I lead without your honor being impuned by this. You can, of course, do whatever you want, but you must know that I will deny you as my brother and family if you don't follow the demands of honor, the only one fitting for a Crown Prince!
AW's reply, Dresden 29. August: „My very dear Brother. I am so convinced of my incapacity and of the uselessness of which I could be in the army, since it has pleased you to repeat my faults to me, that I will take good care not to bother you there. However, I cannot deny that it is a very great sorrow to me that my care and my application have been in vain, and that I see myself at my age a useless member of the State, having no other resource than to spend my life in retirement. Notwithstanding this I assure you that, although you condemned me, without hearing me and that you attributed to me perhaps more fault than I deserve, that I will always take part in all that can contribute to the accomplishment of your wishes. I have the honor to be with the deepest respect, my very dear brother, your very humble, very obedient, very faithful servant and brother Guillaume.
My dear brother. It is better to be a useless member in an army than a harmful member. You will do what you want, I don't meddle in your business anymore; but it would be better for you to be in my army, as you have always been there, than to stay in Dresden.
Brotherly Conduct II: The Main Act
This year which I expect to have won is worth as much as five of the preceding ones, and, if in the future I can serve as mediator for the belligerent powers, I will have created for Prussia the greatest role that it can play in peacetime; and do you count for nothing the pleasure of stopping the Queen of Hungary, of humiliating, or to put it better, of destroying Saxony, of making Bestushew despair? These are the consequences that a little stroke of the pen will have.
Yes, well. The Diplomatic Revolution happens, also by a little stroke of the pen, France is now Austria‘s ally, and AW dares to wonder whether maybe, just maybe, having so many nations to fight against is a bit dangerous?
My dear brother. If our enemies force us to wage war, we must ask…: where are they? but not…: how many are there? We have nothing to fear, our enemies have more reason to run than us, and, according to the rule of probabilities, we will get out of this trap with all possible honor. Let the women in Berlin talk about sharing treaties ... but, for Prussian officers who fought our wars, they must have seen that neither the number nor the difficulties could have robbed us of the victory; they must think that these are the same troops now as in the last war, that the whole army is more trained in the maneuvers of battles, and that, if we do not fall into very rough blunders, it is morally impossible that we miss our shot. This is a comforting thought, my dear brother, which, I hope, will dissipate the fogs that politicians and political ladies have spread over the city. I embrace you, assuring you of the tenderness with which I am, my dear brother, your faithful brother and servant
Federic.
Naturally, when things start to go wrong, there is one person whose fault it can't possibly be. How much or little AW was at fault for the military disaster to come has been debated ever since it happened. He's written a defense before he died, but had been dissuaded from publishing it mid war. In the end, it wasn't published until the late 19th century, and then it was condemned by patriotic Prussian historians as "one sided" (you think?) and damaging to the memory of the Great King. Among the points of contention: did Fritz give AW clear or conflicting orders - on top of everything else going wrong, several of their letters crossed or were delivered too late - , could AW, given the information he had, have acted differently, did he just let things happen without trying to prevent disaster? Ziebura argued:
The relative immovability of his army wasn't Wilhelm's fault. The King had dumped everything on him which he himself hadn't wanted to be burdened with - canons, pontons and the heavy baggage. Hence, the Prince needed urgently a positive order from Friedrich - what exactly did his supreme commander want him to do? Cover Silesia or remain in Bohemia and protect Zittau, for as things stood, the former and the later were mutually exclusive. (...) If Friedrich and with him later historians blame the Prince of Prussia for his hesitation, his "too long war councils", his indicisiveness, even his phlegma, they should have asked for the reason for his remaining in Leipa. That reason was his incapability to act against the King's explicit wishes and to rely solely on his own judgment. He wasn't the only one finding himself in this position. The Prince of Bevern in Breslau, Schmettau in Dresden and Finck at Maxen had all, by following the King's orders against their better knowledge, experienced a fiacso. They were all punished with disgrace, with a casheering.
The public condemnation of AW and all top officers - except for Winterfeldt, who had been one of the generals with AW on this campaign but was also one of Fritz' most trusted generals and had to read out the points of accusation against the others - as decribed by Fontane you already have read. Remember, Fritz refused to speak to AW on that occason, though according to AW's later defense essay: Shortly after he called General Goltz and told him: "He may tell my brother and all his Generals that if I had done justice, I'd have had beheaded the lot of them."
A stunned AW returns to Bautzen, writing a letter to Fritz not in the Trier file, asking for a commission to be formed to investigate his behavior; he is sure that they will clear his name. What Fritz writes back is this:
You have put my affairs in a desperate situation by your bad behavior; it is not my enemies who will make me lose, but the wrong actions you have taken. My generals are inexcusable, either for having advised you badly, or for having allowed you to make such bad decisions. Your ears are only accustomed to the language of flatterers; Daun didn't flatter you, and you see the aftermath. IN this sad situation it only remains for me to take the most desperate actions. I will fight, and we will all be massacred, if we cannot succeed. I am not accusing your heart, but your inability and your lack of judgment to take the best advantage. I‘m telling you the truth. Who has only one moment to live, has nothing to hide. I wish you more happiness than I had.
Fritz had forbidden contact between AW and Heinrich (or anyone else) at this point. Heinrich ignored this and went to Bautzen along with his AD Henckel through whose war diary we know about this. On this occason, AW showed him all the letters Fritz had written him before and after and gave him a thorough description of the campaign. Heinrich agreed with AW that the King blaming Wilhelm exlusively for the botched withdrawal was not justified. He also supported AW's decision to go to Dresden when he saw how much weight his brother had lost and how miserable he looked.
In Dresden, things didn't get better. Fever, insomnia, throwing up, and increasing desperation. Renewed petitions to justify in front Fritz didn't work.
I do not reply to your letter, my dear Brother, because your head is spinning, and I believe that you wrote it in a delirium of hot fever. I am your faithful brother and servant
Federic
At which point AW asked for permission to return to Berlin. This was about the worst thing he could have done. Writes Fritz:
What, you want to flee, while we fight to keep the state for you and your family? You want to set an example to cowards of the army, who may say: We are only asking for what the Prince of Prussia has obtained? Blush to the bottom of your soul the proposals you make to me; you speak of your honor: it lay in leading the army well and not to lose four battaillons, your magazine and your baggage in one stroke. I willl not entrust you another commando again for as long as I live. (...) But you may remain with the army I lead without your honor being impuned by this. You can, of course, do whatever you want, but you must know that I will deny you as my brother and family if you don't follow the demands of honor, the only one fitting for a Crown Prince!
AW's reply, Dresden 29. August: „My very dear Brother. I am so convinced of my incapacity and of the uselessness of which I could be in the army, since it has pleased you to repeat my faults to me, that I will take good care not to bother you there. However, I cannot deny that it is a very great sorrow to me that my care and my application have been in vain, and that I see myself at my age a useless member of the State, having no other resource than to spend my life in retirement. Notwithstanding this I assure you that, although you condemned me, without hearing me and that you attributed to me perhaps more fault than I deserve, that I will always take part in all that can contribute to the accomplishment of your wishes. I have the honor to be with the deepest respect, my very dear brother, your very humble, very obedient, very faithful servant and brother
Guillaume.
My dear brother. It is better to be a useless member in an army than a harmful member. You will do what you want, I don't meddle in your business anymore; but it would be better for you to be in my army, as you have always been there, than to stay in Dresden.